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NOTE
The Constitutionality of Using Eminent Domain to
Condemn Underwater Mortgage Loans
Katharine Roller*
One of the most visible and devastating components of the financial crisis that
began in 2007 and 2008 has been a nationwide foreclosure crisis. In the wake
of ultimately ineffective attempts at federal policy intervention to address the
foreclosure crisis, a private firm has proposed that counties and municipalities
use their power of eminent domain to seize “underwater” mortgage loans—
mortgage loans in which the debt exceeds the value of the underlying prop-
erty—from the private securitization trusts that currently hold them. Having
condemned the mortgage loans, the counties and municipalities would reduce
the debt to a level below the value of the property and then sell the new loans
to private investors. This Note contends that while the condemnation of “un-
derwater” mortgage loans is likely constitutional under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it would likely not survive an
Article I Contracts Clause challenge, despite the moribund nature of Contracts
Clause jurisprudence over the last half-century.
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Introduction
The 2007–2008 financial crisis caused foreclosures to skyrocket from a
precrisis average of 252,000 per year1 to more than 900,000 in 2009.2 The
federal government’s attempts to solve this wave of foreclosures failed to
provide meaningful relief to either individual homeowners or the struggling
housing market.3 As a result, the number of foreclosures rose even higher—
to more than one million in 20104—before falling slightly to more than
860,000 between March 2011 and March 2012.5 As of January 2012, another
1.4 million homes were in the process of foreclosure, moving through the
pipeline to join the 3.3 million homes that have gone into foreclosure since
the crisis began.6
Federal policy failures, however, do not limit the creativity of local gov-
ernments.7 In 2011, the private investment firm Mortgage Resolution Part-
ners approached San Bernardino County, one of the counties hit hardest by
the foreclosure crisis, proposing an unusual solution that the county could
implement without the federal government.8 Its proposal targeted “under-
water” home loans, loans in which the outstanding balance is greater than
the value of the real estate that secured the debt. Local governments would
use eminent domain to seize these loans from the financial institutions that
hold them. They would then cut the debt to 95 percent of the value of the
real estate and sell the loans to select private investors. The firm claimed that
this plan would be everything federal efforts were not: flexible, cheap, aimed
at underwater homeowners, indifferent to moral hazard, and not premised
on loan holders’ voluntary compliance.9
1. See Teresa Mears, Foreclosure Rate Declining but Still High, MSN Real Estate (Dec.
5, 2012, 6:36 AM), http://realestate.msn.com/blogs/listedblogpost.aspx?post=86125cd7-7098-
4322-8ad7-e2e7b7d76f82&ref=bfv.
2. Binyamin Applebaum, Cautious Moves on Foreclosures Haunting Obama, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/business/economy/
slow-response-to-housing-crisis-now-weighs-on-obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3. Id.; see also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Home-
owners: Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan Modifica-
tions, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 153, 178–87 (2011); David Reiss, Eminently Reasonable, Nat’l
L.J., Sept. 24, 2012, at 35.
4. Applebaum, supra note 2.
5. CoreLogic Reports More Than 860,000 Completed Foreclosures Nationally in the Last




7. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
8. Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Fight Closely Watched by Other Strug-
gling Communities, Huffington Post (Sept. 1, 2012, 4:25 PM) (updated Sept. 25, 2012, 3:29
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/eminent-domain-mortgages_n_1836710
.html; see also New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Reiss, supra note 3.
9. See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Housing’s Last Chance?, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2012, at A21,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/opinion/nocera-housings-last-chance.html;
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A number of localities have publicly considered adopting this plan to
condemn underwater loans (“the Plan”), or some variation of it, since the
firm first pitched it to counties and municipalities in California’s Inland
Empire. San Bernardino County was the first to consider adopting the
Plan,10 although it later decided against doing so;11 Chicago and Sacramento,
among others, have also taken steps toward implementing the Plan.12 Re-
cently, Richmond, California became the first city to begin implementing
the Plan, and a coalition of investors has already filed suit against the city.13
This Note argues that seizing underwater mortgage loans, although a
constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain, is unconstitutional
under the Contracts Clause. Part I describes the conditions that have led
local governments to consider the Plan and outlines how the Plan would
function. Part II argues that the Plan would likely be constitutional under
the Takings Clause because it is a rational response to the problems of blight
and market malfunction. Part III, however, considers the Contracts Clause
bar to the implementation of the Plan and concludes that the Plan may
resurrect this clause from its jurisprudential grave by presenting the first
serious Contracts Clause concerns in decades.
I. The Mortgage Seizure and Refinance Plan
The Plan is a response to the social and economic conditions created by
the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Section I.A provides a brief background of
the foreclosure crisis, focusing on the facts and conditions that bear on the
constitutional analysis in Parts II and III. Section I.B explains how the Plan
Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and Public/Private
Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Economic Recovery 15–35
(Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 12-12, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2038029.
10. See Matthew Goldstein & Jennifer Ablan, Exclusive: Investors Tout Controversial
“Condemnation” for Housing Fix, Reuters, June 8, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/08/us-mortgages-condemnation-housing-idUSBRE85719Z20120608.
11. Alejandro Lazo, San Bernardino County Abandons Mortgage Plan, L.A. Times, Jan.
25, 2013, at B3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/25/business/law-fi-eminent-
domain-20130125.
12. Chi. City Council Res. R2012-695 of the J. Comm. of the Comm. on Fin. & Comm.
on Hous. & Real Estate (Chi., Ill. 2012); Hudson Sangree, Sacramento Area Officials Explore
Using Eminent Domain to Aid Underwater Homeowners, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 11, 2012, at
1A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2012/08/11/4715792/sacramento-area-officials-
explore.html.
13. See Alejandro Lazo, U.S. Warns Against Eminent-Domain Mortgage Seizures, L.A.
Times, Aug. 8, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/08/business/law-fi-eminent-domain-
lawsuit-20130809; Christopher Matthews, Feds Say No Way to Using Eminent Domain to Help
Underwater Homeowners, Aug. 9, 2013, Time, http://business.time.com/2013/08/09/feds-say-
no-way-to-using-eminent-domain-to-help-underwater-homeowners/. This development oc-
curred shortly before this Note was sent to the printer. A team of investors including Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, BlackRock, and Bank of New York Mellon has filed suit against the city and
its private partner, Mortgage Resolution Partners.
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is structured and why its implementation would likely give rise to legal
challenges.
A. The Foreclosure Crisis
When housing prices peaked in 2006, the widespread assumption on
Wall Street was that they would continue to rise forever.14 Investors believed,
and rating agencies agreed, that securities backed by pools of residential
mortgage loans—even subprime loans or loans extended without documen-
tation from borrowers—were safe, attractive investments.15 When the hous-
ing bubble burst and the sudden devaluation of those mortgage-backed
securities sparked the financial crisis, the federal government bailed out the
banks that had made these bad bets.16 But the government did not bail out
the homeowners who were unable to make their monthly payments.17 There
were several reasons for this—expense, complexity, belief that failing home-
owners posed less risk than failing banks, and contempt for homeowners
who had lived beyond their means—and perhaps there was no effective and
fair way to implement such a program.18 The result was a national foreclo-
sure crisis that has cost 3.3 million Americans their homes.19
Homeowners with subprime loans were the first to default.20 Some had
been targets of predatory or discriminatory lending or even outright fraud,
while others had signed documents obligating them to pay loans that they
did not understand or did not care to understand.21 By 2008, the crisis had
spread beyond subprime loans.22 The foreclosures of subprime mortgages
had flooded the housing market with vacant homes, which caused prices to
plummet. At the same time, the general economic slowdown had wiped out
savings and terminated jobs for homeowners who previously could have af-
forded their monthly payments.23 Those homeowners, desperate to stave off
foreclosure, stopped spending on other things. The depression of consumer
spending caused unemployment to rise, which caused more foreclosures and
14. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 6, 111
(2011) [hereinafter FCIC Report], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf.
15. See id. at 8–9, 18, 44.
16. Id. at 373–75.
17. The Home Affordable Modification Program can lower monthly payments and en-
courage (but not require) principal reduction and short sales, but it does not provide cash aid.
See Making Home Affordable, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov (last visited Apr. 4,
2013).
18. See Crespi, supra note 3; Applebaum, supra note 2; Reiss, supra note 3.
19. CoreLogic, supra note 5.
20. See Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime Loans, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/12
credit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
21. FCIC Report, supra note 14, at 6–9, 78, 90, 160–64.
22. Bajaj & Story, supra note 20.
23. See id.
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made it impossible for renters to buy or homeowners to move, further de-
pressing housing prices and causing even more foreclosures.24
Underwater homeowners both contributed to and suffered from this cy-
cle. Underwater homeowners cannot sell their houses in the traditional way,
since the purchase prices of the homes are not enough to pay off their
loans;25 instead, they must resort to short sales, where the holder of the loan
takes the purchase price in full satisfaction of the debt, usually waiving the
holder’s right to the deficiency.26 As a mortgage holder that waives the defi-
ciency will have to write off thousands, sometimes tens of thousands or hun-
dreds of thousands, of dollars, many are reluctant to give their permission
for a short sale.27 Many underwater homeowners are therefore trapped in
homes that they can neither leave nor refinance, even if they can no longer
afford them. It is unsurprising, then, that underwater homeowners are sig-
nificantly more likely to default and go into foreclosure than homeowners
who still have equity in their homes.28 This creates a vicious circle: underwa-
ter homes go into foreclosure, foreclosures drive down the value of nearby
homes, and as the value of those nearby homes sinks below the debt owed
on them, they, too, go underwater.29
The foreclosure crisis is unlikely to end in the next few years, although
the foreclosure rate has declined between 2010 and 2012 and will likely grad-
ually continue to do so.30 One analyst recently estimated that, over the next
few years, homeowners will likely default on 17.7 percent of the 52.5 million
residential mortgage loans in the United States.31 Many of those homeown-
ers are likely to default because they are underwater.32 When those 7.4 to 9.3
million homeowners default, that will only add to the inventory of unsold
housing, depressing prices and driving more homeowners underwater and
24. See FCIC Report, supra note 14, at 389–90; Li Gan & Qinghua Zhang, The Market
Thickness and the Impact of Unemployment on Housing Market Outcomes, Tex. A&M Univ.,
http://econweb.tamu.edu/gan/academic/gan-zhang-housing.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2013)
(“[B]eing unemployed practically prevents a household from entering the housing market as a
buyer.”).
25. See Bajaj & Story, supra note 20.
26. Nelse Thompson Miller, Short Sales Overview with an Emphasis on Broker Issues,
Prac. Real Est. Law., May 2010, at 9, 13.
27. FCIC Report, supra note 14, at 406.
28. See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., To Fix Housing, See the Data, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2011, at
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/opinion/to-fix-the-housing-crisis-read-
the-data.html.
29. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-34, Vacant Properties: Grow-
ing Number Increases Communities’ Costs and Challenges 48 (2011) [hereinafter
GAO].
30. See CoreLogic, supra note 5.
31. Strengthening the Housing Market and Minimizing Losses to Taxpayers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 31 (2012) (statement of Laurie S. Goodman, Senior Managing
Director, Amherst Securities), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76281
/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76281.pdf.
32. See id.
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therefore closer to default.33 The light at the end of the tunnel is a long way
off.
A variety of players hold mortgage loans: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
hold the largest number, accounting for 23% and 13% of home mortgage
debt, respectively.34 Banks and other major financial institutions hold an-
other 33%, and other investors—such as individuals and credit unions—
hold 7%.35 Finally, governmental and private pools or trusts hold 22% of
home mortgage debt. Private securitization trusts, specifically, hold 12% of
all home mortgage debt.36 Private securitization trusts are the entities that
administer mortgage-backed securities. The trustees that operate these trusts
oversee a pool of mortgage loans on behalf of a group of investors who buy
securities from the trust on the strength of the loans in the trust’s portfo-
lio.37 Usually the day-to-day administration of the loans in the collateral
pool is handled by a loan servicer, a business that specializes in processing
payments and collecting on delinquent loans.38 Loans held by private securi-
tization trusts or other private investors are three times as likely to be under-
water as loans held by Fannie or Freddie.39
B. The Strategy and Structure of the Plan
There is a growing consensus that principal reduction—permanently re-
ducing the amount of a loan’s outstanding principal balance—is key to
stemming the flood of foreclosures.40 It is the most effective modification
strategy for the long term because it takes account of the new economic
realities that families face, such as permanently lower wages and long-term
unemployment or underemployment.41 And only principal reduction ad-
dresses the vicious circle of underwater homes driving down the value of
nearby properties until they, too, go underwater.42 Indeed, in the fourth
quarter of 2012, principal reduction was used in more than one-third of
modifications to loans held in bank portfolios, which have more flexibility in
33. See id.; Nocera, supra note 28.




37. See FCIC Report, supra note 14, at 42–43.
38. See Making Payments to Your Mortgage Servicer, Fed. Trade Commission (June
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea10.shtm.
39. Hallman, supra note 8. The distressed state of most trusts’ portfolios can be attrib-
uted largely to the fact that Fannie and Freddie were less willing to buy subprime and other
risky loans than were private securitization trusts. See FCIC Report, supra note 14, at xxvi.
40. John Griffith & Jordan Eizenga, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Sharing the Pain
and Gain in the Housing Market 1, 10–14 (2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/03/pdf/principal_reductions.pdf; see also Laurie Goodman et al.,
The Case for Principal Reductions, J. Structured Fin., Fall 2011, at 29, 31–32.
41. Griffith & Eizenga, supra note 40, at 1, 7.
42. See Goodman et al., supra note 40, at 37–38.
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modifying loans than do securitization trusts.43 Principal reduction is thus
usually in the best interest of all parties.44 While the benefits to homeowners
and the local economy are obvious, the holder of the mortgage loan also
benefits.45 A homeowner who makes payments renders his loan a perform-
ing asset—a steady source of cash. By contrast, a vacant home eats up the
note holder’s money in taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance, and inspec-
tions, while providing no income.46 If the trust forecloses on the mortgage,
the foreclosure itself can cost up to $50,000, according to one estimate.47
Why is principal reduction so rare, then? For loans held in private
securitization trusts, the structure of the securitization agreement itself can
often restrict the ability of the servicer or the trustee to modify loans, even
when it would be in the best interest of investors to do so.48 The agreements
also set up a fee system for the servicers who administer the loans, and that
system creates perverse incentives for the servicer to avoid principal reduc-
tion in order to keep the homeowner in default and ultimately to foreclose.49
For example, many servicers are paid a percentage of the outstanding princi-
pal on their serviced loans, which means that principal reduction has a di-
rect negative effect on their compensation.50
The Plan would seek both to compensate for that inflexibility and per-
versity on the part of the private securitization trusts and to profit from it.
Although the new, refinanced loans would have a lower face value because
the amount of the debt would be slashed, they would theoretically have
greater expected value because the homeowner would be more likely to re-
pay that debt. A $200,000 loan that the homeowner is likely to pay in full is
43. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Mortgage Metrics Re-
port, Fourth Quarter 2012, at 28 tbl.20 (2013), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publi-
cations/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mortgage-metrics-2012/mortgage-
metrics-q4-2012.pdf; see also Ruth Simon, Study Buoys Mortgage Modification, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 4, 2009, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123875775797386333.html
(“Servicers said they have more flexibility to rework loan terms for mortgages they own than
for those held by investors.”).
44. Robert J. Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. Times, June
24, 2012, at BU6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/business/economy/real-es-
tates-collective-action-problem.html.
45. See id.
46. See GAO, supra note 29, at 34–35.
47. J. Econ. Comm., 112th Cong., Special Rep. on Sheltering Neighborhoods
from the Subprime Foreclosure Storm 14 (Apr. 2007).
48. See Will Cejudo et al., Modifying Residential Mortgage Loans: Tax Consequences for
REMICs and REMIC Investors, 7 J. Tax’n Fin. Products, no. 3, 2008, at 41, 42–43 (noting
that certain tax provisions in pooling and servicing agreements “effectively prohibit . . . the
modification of an existing mortgage loan” in the form of principal reduction). But see Karen
Weise, When Denying Loan Mods, Loan Servicers Often Wrongly Blame Investors, ProPublica
(July 23, 2010, 6:50 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/when-denying-loan-mods-loan-
servicers-often-blame-investors-wrongly (arguing that the influence of contractual provisions
in prohibiting modifications is overrated).
49. Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage
Loan Modification, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 755 passim (2011).
50. Id. at 807.
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worth more than a $300,000 loan that he will likely walk away from or be
unable to pay. The administrators of private securitization trusts are aware
of this trade-off but have been unable or unwilling to pursue principal re-
duction under the current securitization and servicing agreements.51 For this
reason, Mortgage Resolution Partners decided that its version of the Plan
would target only loans held by private securitization trusts;52 other entities
considering the Plan would likely do the same.
The Plan proceeds in several steps. First, the local government enacting
the Plan would set up new loan securitization trusts with the help of a pri-
vate firm. Second, the locality would raise money from private investors.
This money would be used to fund the third step: the local government
would use its power of eminent domain to condemn the mortgage notes and
take control of them from the old securitization trusts,53 and the private
investors’ money would pay the old trusts the required “just compensa-
tion.”54 At this stage, a court would almost always get involved because the
valuation of the loans would likely be disputed.55
Once the loans were in the local government’s control, the government
would write the principal down to some amount below the fair market value
of the home to create equity for the homeowner.56 The government would
then transfer the refinanced loans to the new securitization trusts set up by
the locality, and the private investors who funded the condemnation phase
of the plan would be repaid in shares of the securities backed by the refi-
nanced loans.57 At the end of the process, the homeowners who were previ-
ously underwater would have equity in their homes and reduced monthly
51. See Hockett, supra note 9, at 18.
52. Alejandro Lazo, Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan Is Targeted, L.A. Times, Sept. 11,
2012, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/11/business/la-fi-eminent-domain
-20120911.
53. The Plan is generally described as a plan to seize “mortgages,” but it is more accu-
rate to say that the locality would seize the note—the loan—secured by the mortgage on the
property. Because the mortgage follows the note, the end result is the same: the local govern-
ment would own both the note and the mortgage that secures it. See U.C.C. § 9-203(g) (2010).
54. U.S. Const. amend. V. As proposed by Mortgage Resolution Partners, homeowners
could choose whether their loans would be considered for the Plan; participation would be
completely voluntary. Rick E. Rayl, Eminent Domain and Underwater Mortgages: Framing the
Debate, Part 1, Cal. Eminent Domain Rep. (July 25, 2012), http://www.californiaeminent
domainreport.com/2012/07/articles/eminent-domain-and-underwater-mortgages-framing-
the-debate-part-1/.
55. See Examining California County’s Controversial Proposal to Use Eminent Domain to
Provide Relief for Underwater Homeowners, Am. Bankr. Inst. (July 26, 2012), http://
news.abi.org/podcasts/118-examining-california-countys-controversial-proposal-to-use-
eminent-domain-to-provide-re.
56. Mortgage Resolution Partners’ version of the Plan would reduce the principal to 95
percent of the home’s fair market value, but there is no special significance to the 95 percent
figure—local governments could choose some other benchmark below the value of the home
securing the loan. Hockett, supra note 9, at 33.
57. Mortgage Resolution Partners, Homeownership Protection Program, at 12, available
at online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/EMINENT-powerpoint.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2013).
October 2013] The Constitutionality of Using Eminent Domain 147
payments based on the new principal balance. Ultimately, homeowners
would end up in much the same situation that they started in—making
payments to a servicer that administered their loans on behalf of a securi-
tization trust—but on substantially better financial terms. If everything went
according to plan, homeowners would be rescued from dire financial straits
at no cost to the government, and communities would benefit from a reduc-
tion in foreclosures.58
Although San Bernardino County ultimately decided not to pursue con-
demnation of underwater mortgage loans,59 Richmond, California has be-
gun implementation of the Plan, and other cities and counties across the
country have demonstrated an interest in it.60 In Chicago, where 100,000
mortgage loans are underwater, primarily in minority neighborhoods, city
aldermen have held a preliminary hearing on adopting the Plan.61 Similarly,
the Berkeley City Council voted to look into the Plan in conjunction with
Alameda County and the Oakland City Council,62 and city council members
in Sacramento and Elk Grove, California, have also taken steps toward im-
plementing the Plan.63 Finally, Suffolk County, New York, where one in ten
home mortgage loans is underwater, has indicated an interest in the Plan,64
as has the city government in Detroit,65 where more than 40 percent of
mortgage loans are underwater.66
The securities industry, which packages, sells, and administers the mort-
gage-backed securities that the Plan would target, has publicly opposed its
adoption.67 The high rate of defaults has already undermined the stability of
the mortgage loan pools backing these securities; the industry fears that the
future viability of such products would be seriously endangered if investors
58. See Robert C. Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solu-
tion for Underwater Mortgage Debt That Can Benefit Literally Everyone 18–20 (Cornell Law
Sch., Research Paper No. 12-64, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2173358.
59. Lazo, supra note 11.
60. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
61. Mary Ellen Podmolik & John Byrne, Mayor Resists Eminent Domain Plan, Chi.
Trib., Aug. 15, 2012, § 2, at 2.
62. Andrew S. Ross, Eminent Domain Mortgage Plan Gaining Support, S.F. Chron.,
Aug. 1, 2012, at E1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/business/bottomline/article/Eminent-
domain-plea-gaining-support-3751091.php.
63. Sangree, supra note 12.
64. Jennifer Medina, California County Considers a Rescue Plan for Struggling Home-
owners, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/07/15/
us/a-county-considers-rescue-of-underwater-homes.html.
65. Peter S. Goodman, Eminent Domain as Underwater Mortgages Fix: Why Some Cities
Are Considering Unorthodox Measure, Huffington Post (Oct. 1, 2012, 11:22 AM) (updated
Oct. 1, 2012, 12:52 PM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/01/eminent-
domain-mortgages_n_1917391.html; Hallman, supra note 8.
66. Richard Florida, The Geography of Underwater Homes, Atlantic Cities (Aug. 23,
2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2012/08/geography-underwater-homes/303
4/.
67. See, e.g., Eminent Domain Resource Center: Activity, sifma, http://www.sifma.org/
issues/capital-markets/securitization/eminent-domain/activity/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
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believed that their collateral could be seized at any moment by local govern-
ments.68 The securities industry is also concerned that the loans seized from
securitization trusts would be significantly undervalued, forcing the trusts to
take a heavy loss on hundreds or thousands of condemned loans.69 A leading
securities industry group has commissioned a memorandum outlining legal
arguments against the Plan from O’Melveny & Myers LLP.70 This memoran-
dum is the first serious consideration of potential legal challenges to the
Plan. On the other side, Mortgage Resolution Partners’ consultant, Cornell
Law School Professor Robert Hockett,71 has issued two white papers offering
legal and policy justifications for adopting the Plan.72
The Plan is a novel idea, and supporters and adversaries alike are taking
it seriously. As local governments adopt it, the resources and attention
brought to bear on ensuing legal challenges will likely be formidable. Some
legal issues, particularly state constitutional issues and the valuation of con-
demned loans, would vary based on state law and the specific details of each
implementation of the Plan. But wherever the Plan is instituted, there will be
two important questions under the U.S. Constitution: first, whether the Plan
is a constitutional exercise of state power under the Takings Clause, and
second, whether the contractual impairment that the Plan would cause
would violate the Contracts Clause. Both Professor Hockett in his white pa-
pers and O’Melveny & Myers in its memorandum touch on these issues, but
their treatment is cursory and, more importantly, represents the perspective
of paid consultants.73 This Note seeks to fill a void in the emerging commen-
tary by supplying an impartial and detailed analysis of these constitutional
questions.
II. Constitutionality Under the Takings Clause
The Plan is built on the power of eminent domain, which is governed by
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states, “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”74 For a taking
68. See id.
69. Am. Bankr. Inst., supra note 55.
70. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger et al., O’Melveny & Myers LLP, to Sec. Indus.
& Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Proposal 3 (July 16, 2012) [hereinafter
O’Melveny & Myers] (on file with recipient), available at http://www.sifma.org/workarea/
downloadasset.aspx?id=8589939523.
71. Alison Frankel, Eminent Domain, MBS and the U.S. Constitution: A One-Sided
Fight?, Reuters (July 11, 2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/
11/eminent-domain-mbs-and-the-u-s-constitution-a-one-sided-fight/ (noting that Hockett
was hired by Mortgage Resolution Partners to research the legality of exercising eminent do-
main over private mortgage loans).
72. Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 58.
73. See Hockett, supra note 9; Hockett, supra note 58; O’Melveny & Myers, supra note
70.
74. U.S. Const. amend. V. Contracts are condemnable property for eminent domain
purposes. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897); see also U.S.
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977).
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to be constitutional, it must first be “for public use,” and second, just com-
pensation must be paid to the property owner in exchange for the taken
property. A taking satisfies the public use requirement as long as it serves a
“public purpose”; the property need not literally be open to “use by the
public.”75 Courts apply rational basis review to determine whether a taking
is constitutional, largely deferring to the policy judgments of legislative bod-
ies and asking only whether the taking was rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose.76
Section II.A argues that the Plan serves two public purposes that are
likely to pass constitutional muster: the prevention or repair of neighbor-
hood blight and the correction of market dysfunction in the residential
mortgage market. Section II.B contends that the Plan is rationally related to
achieving each of these public purposes and therefore is constitutional under
the Takings Clause.77
A. Conceivable Public Purpose
The Plan would serve two independently sufficient public purposes
under the Takings Clause: stopping blight in residential neighborhoods and
correcting dysfunction in the residential mortgage market. Foreclosures can
poison the neighborhoods in which they take place by creating vacant
properties,78 which cause blight,79 raise crime rates,80 and reduce the prop-
erty value of nearby homes.81 And underwater homes, even when occupied,
drag down the aesthetic and financial condition of the neighborhood, both
because the homeowners may wish to put every penny toward their loan
payments rather than maintenance and because they may not be motivated
to invest in maintenance and improvements for a house they fear that they
will lose.82
Addressing blight is the classic public purpose for a taking that transfers
property from the hands of one private party to another.83 More than fifty
years ago in Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court held that governments
75. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
77. The question of “just compensation” only arises once a taking is found to be consti-
tutional, and the inquiry is irrelevant to the threshold question of constitutionality. This Note
will not address it.
78. GAO, supra note 29, at 24–25.
79. Id. at 1.
80. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclo-
sures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 Housing Stud. 851, 862–63 (2006).
81. GAO, supra note 29, at 44–46. Boarded-up windows, homes stripped of metal
pipes, graffiti, and squatters are all classic symptoms of blight. See, e.g., FCIC Report, supra
note 14, at 10, 14; Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2009 (Magazine), at
MM28, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/03/08/magazine/08Foreclosure-t.html.
82. Hockett, supra note 9, at 52–53.
83. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954).
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can condemn private property and sell it to other private parties in the ser-
vice of a plan to address blight, even if not all the condemned properties are
themselves blighted.84 The Court’s most recent decision on the “public use”
test, Kelo v. City of New London, pushed Berman to its limits by lowering the
standard from “blight” to mere “distress.”85 A city may now condemn a
swath of private homes based solely on the justification that the area needs
“economic rejuvenation,” even when there is no actual blight.86 Areas con-
sidering the Plan—such as the Inland Empire, Detroit, and Chicago—have
seen the damage that foreclosures can inflict on their communities. Their
exercise of the power of eminent domain would be consistent with Berman
and arguably less aggressive than Kelo.
Critics contend that the Plan, which seeks to prevent blight before it
occurs or worsens, is distinguishable from Kelo, which sought to remedy
preexisting blight.87 This echoes some courts’ concerns that because blight
could arise at any time, “[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all prop-
erty.”88 If the Plan were adopted as a strictly preventive measure in wealthy
areas not suffering the effects of blight, courts might well strike it down on
this theory. But areas currently considering the Plan—Detroit and Chicago,
for instance—have already seen the effects of blight on their communities.89
It is also true that the Plan focuses narrowly on the taking itself, unlike
the “comprehensive” and multifaceted development scheme in Kelo.90 But it
is inaccurate to say that “the systematic transfer of property from A to B is
the scheme itself.”91 As described in Part I, the condemnation is only one
part of the Plan, and the Plan’s ultimate goal is refinancing the loans after
their condemnation. Simply transferring the notes from A to B would likely
have no effect on the foreclosure rate because the homeowners who signed
those notes would still be underwater. The Plan would therefore have a
“comprehensive character” beyond the taking itself.92
84. Id. at 34.
85. See 545 U.S. 469, 480–81 (2005). The “distress” that the Kelo Court found sufficient
consisted of rising unemployment, population decline, and a lack of “leisure and recreational
opportunities.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473–75. The Court did not contend that living conditions in
the community were substandard or that living there was actively unpleasant. Id. “Blight,” on
the other hand, is more severe: “[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions” that “suffo-
cate the spirit,” and “an ugly sore . . . on the community which robs it of charm.” Berman, 348
U.S. at 32.
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
87. O’Melveny & Myers, supra note 70, at 4.
88. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See Chi. City Council Res. R2012-695 of the J. Comm. of the Comm. on Fin. &
Comm. on Hous. & Real Estate 2 (Chi., Ill. 2012); Susan Saulny, Razing the City to Save the
City, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/
21detroit.html.
90. O’Melveny & Myers, supra note 70, at 3–4 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484).
91. Id. at 4.
92. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
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The second public purpose that condemning and refinancing underwa-
ter mortgages serves is correcting dysfunction in the residential mortgage
market.93 As discussed in Section I.B, it is frequently in the best interest of all
parties to modify a homeowner’s loan when the homeowner is having diffi-
culty making his monthly payments, because a vacant home becomes an
expensive proposition for the holder of the mortgage note.94 The pooling
and servicing agreements can prevent trustees from pursuing modifications
even when modifying the loans would better serve the trust’s investors, and
servicers reap higher fees from foreclosing on troubled homeowners than
from keeping them in their homes.95 These are symptoms of serious dys-
function in the residential mortgage market. Perverse incentives and collec-
tive-action problems combine to harm homeowners, neighborhoods, and
cities, while mortgage holders and servicers are forced to pay for foreclosures
that are not in their interest to begin with and that cause significant damage
to the reputation of their industry.96 Nobody wins.
Case law endorses the use of eminent domain to address such market
dysfunctions. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court
approved the use of eminent domain to address a land oligopoly in Hawaii
where a “large number of persons declare[d] that they [were] willing but
unable to buy [houses] at fair prices.”97 And in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
the Court endorsed the condemnation of trade secrets to remedy barriers to
entry in the pesticide market that undermined competition.98 These takings
do not address blight or acute economic distress but rather use the power of
eminent domain to remake a broken system, bestowing an immediate bene-
fit on some players to create a better playing field for everyone.99 This is
what the Plan aims to do—by removing artificial barriers to loan modifica-
tion, which have caused a breakdown in the system, the Plan seeks to bestow
a benefit on the market as a whole.100 By aiming to correct this kind of
market malfunction, the Plan serves an established public purpose and
stands on firm constitutional footing.
93. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (correcting market fail-
ure in land market is a legitimate public purpose).
94. See supra Section I.B.
95. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. See Shiller, supra note 44.
97. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
98. 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984).
99. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986 (where a cumbersome, expensive registration process
for pesticides deterred new entrants from the market, disclosing trade secrets from previous
applications to new applicants was constitutional); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232, 242 (where land
was concentrated in the hands of only seventy-two private landowners, “correcting market
failure” in the “malfunctioning” land market by redistributing fees simple to individual home-
owners was constitutional).
100. See generally Hockett, supra note 9.
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B. Rational Relationship to Public Purpose
The second half of the rational basis test asks whether the Plan is a
rational means of preventing blight or correcting market malfunction. The
Plan need not be the best way to achieve those ends—or even a good way; it
merely needs to be a rational means of doing so.101 This is a low standard for
state action to meet.102 As discussed in Section I.B, principal reduction is
essential to slowing foreclosures and is more effective as a long-term strategy
than other types of loan modification.103 Targeting underwater homeowners
in particular is certainly rational: because they are far more likely to default,
reducing a loan’s principal so that a homeowner is no longer underwater
would instantly lower his chance of defaulting.104
Critics warn that the Plan could raise rates on new loans, reduce the
availability of credit, and thereby make it harder to sell the existing backlog
of vacant properties.105 Though this concern may be legitimate, it is irrele-
vant to the constitutional analysis. “States are not required to convince the
courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments” to survive rational
basis review.106 As long as it remains “at least debatable” that seizing under-
water mortgage loans to reduce the principal will have at least some effect
on the foreclosure rate, the second prong of the rational basis test will be
satisfied.107 Because local governments could rationally conclude that impos-
ing principal reduction on loans secured by underwater homes would both
protect neighborhoods from blight and correct a malfunction in the residen-
tial mortgage market, the Plan would likely survive rational basis review.
III. Constitutionality Under the Contracts Clause
Article I of the Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any
. . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”108 Although the Contracts
101. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–41 (“[T]he Court . . . will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S.
668, 680 (1896))).
102. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463–70 (1981) (sus-
taining a milk packaging regulation meant to encourage the use of environmentally superior
options under the rational basis test, even though evidence strongly suggested that the regula-
tion had precisely the opposite effect—increasing the use of environmentally damaging paper-
board packaging).
103. See supra Section I.B.
104. See The Foreclosure Plan: Can’t Pay or Won’t Pay?, Economist, Feb. 21, 2009, at 32,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/13145396.
105. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers, supra note 70, at 5; SIFMA Opposes Use of Eminent
Domain; Will Cause Irreparable Damage to Recovering Housing Market, sifma (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=8589940215.
106. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464.
107. See id. (quoting U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
108. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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Clause is aimed at protecting the expectation of contracting parties gener-
ally,109 the immediate catalyst for its inclusion in the Constitution was
debtor-relief legislation, which states passed in response to the straitened
economic circumstances that followed the Revolutionary War.110 The laws
reduced foreign creditors’ faith in American debts and, more generally, re-
duced all creditors’ faith in their agreements.111 It was these circumstances
that inspired the creation of the Contracts Clause, to provide, in a larger
sense, what a contract itself is meant to provide: stability of expectations.112
In the nineteenth century, the Contracts Clause provided “the constitu-
tional justification for more cases involving the validity of state laws than all
of the other clauses of the Constitution together.”113 Its power began to wane
toward the end of the century, as the Supreme Court increasingly recognized
that a state’s police power can supersede private parties’ desire to maintain
the status quo through contract.114 This move was finalized in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, in which the Supreme Court upheld a Minne-
sota mortgage moratorium law that gave borrowers additional time to catch
up on payments in order to stave off foreclosure.115 Many state laws now
taken for granted—for example, consumer protection and labor laws—“im-
pair[ ] the obligation of Contracts”116 without setting off constitutional
alarms. That said, the Supreme Court’s twentieth-century Contracts Clause
decisions have not been entirely toothless.117
To be constitutional under the Contracts Clause, legislation must satisfy
a two-part test. The first prong requires that the law have a significant and
legitimate public purpose, such as “the remedying of a broad and general
social or economic problem.”118 The second prong requires that the charac-
ter and scope of the contractual impairment be reasonably necessary to
109. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 703, 706 (1984); Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return
to the Original Understanding, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 525, 533 (1987).
110. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934); Benjamin
Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 13–15 (1938); Ep-
stein, supra note 109, at 706.
111. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 454–55 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 462; Charles A. Bieneman, Note, Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional
Case: Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2534, 2552 (1992).
113. Wright, supra note 110, at xiii.
114. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814
(1880). The Contracts Clause’s declining importance can also be traced to the expanded appli-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which gave courts a more power-
ful tool for limiting state regulation. Wright, supra note 110, at 95.
115. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437.
116. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
117. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249–50 (1978)
(striking down an employee benefits law); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
25–26 (1977) (striking down the repeal of a covenant limiting Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey deficits).
118. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983)
(citing Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247, 249, and U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22).
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achieve that public purpose.119 Before applying the two-prong test, however,
courts ask two preliminary questions: Who are the contracting parties, and
how seriously does the law impair the contractual obligations?120 The re-
sponses to these two questions dictate how strictly a court will apply the
two-prong test.121 A court applies the test more strictly when a state seeks to
impair its own obligations to other parties under contract because the state’s
self-interest is at stake.122 Similarly, the more seriously contractual obliga-
tions are impaired, the more closely a court will scrutinize the public pur-
pose of the statute and its proportionality to that public purpose.123
Section III.A explains why the Plan would implicate the Contracts
Clause in the first place. Section III.B considers the preliminary questions
that are necessary to the Contracts Clause inquiry—the identity of the con-
tracting parties and the degree of impairment created by the plan—and ar-
gues that the Plan’s impairment of contracts should be classified as serious
and permanent. Section III.C contends that the Plan serves a significant and
legitimate public purpose and therefore passes the first prong of the Con-
tracts Clause test. But Section III.D argues that the scope of the Plan is not
proportionate and necessary to its public purpose and that it therefore fails
the second prong of the Contracts Clause test.
A. Relevance of the Contracts Clause
It could appear that the Plan presents no Contracts Clause problem be-
cause the state actor would seize a contract before altering it, effecting a
forced sale of the contract instead of an impairment.124 But such a formalis-
tic approach would allow a state actor to circumvent the Contracts Clause by
way of the Takings Clause; instead of impairing a contract directly, the state
actor could simply take it, alter the contract itself, and then pass it along to a




122. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25–26 (applying the rational basis standard to a “modi-
fication of a State’s own financial obligations” and finding that “complete deference to a legis-
lative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-
interest is at stake”).
123. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244–45.
124. While the Supreme Court has noted in passing that “the Contract Clause has never
been thought to protect against the . . . power of eminent domain,” Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 n.6 (1984), this statement was made in relation to the indirect
impairment of a contract through the taking of real property. Here, the situation is different:
what is taken is the contract itself, and therefore the impairment of the contract is not inciden-
tal or indirect. See also Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 690 (1897)
(noting that the Contracts Clause was no bar to a taking where the impaired contract was “a
mere incident to the tangible property” being condemned).
125. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922) (holding that states may
not evade the requirement of just compensation for a taking simply by passing a law that
diminishes the value of a property interest rather than taking it directly).
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way would contradict the Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]f the Contract
Clause is to retain any meaning at all . . . it must be understood to impose
some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual rela-
tionships, even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power.”126
One could also contend that a taking of a contract can never constitute
an impairment because the contract holder receives just compensation and
therefore suffers no financial loss. But this assertion conflates the interests
protected by the Takings Clause and the Contracts Clause, when those inter-
ests are in fact quite different. The Takings Clause protects private parties
from pecuniary loss caused by state action,127 whereas the Contracts Clause
protects against unfair surprise and preserves the institution of contract—
the ability of contracting parties to be secure in their private ordering with-
out having to constantly look over their shoulders for government interfer-
ence.128 Ignoring the different intent of these two constitutional provisions,
and thereby allowing local governments to seize mortgage loan contracts
under the Takings Clause, would render the Contracts Clause “a dead let-
ter”129 and leave the expectations of note holders unprotected. In other
words, the Plan would be one case where the alteration in contractual obli-
gations would be permissible under the Takings Clause but would not be
permissible under the Contracts Clause.
B. Degree of Impairment
As a preliminary matter, a locality adopting the Plan would not impair
contracts to which it was itself a party and therefore would not trigger the
heightened scrutiny applied to a state’s attempt to evade its own obliga-
tions.130 The second preliminary question—the degree of impairment
caused by the Plan—cannot be dealt with so quickly.
The degree of impairment worked by the Plan may prove difficult for
courts to classify. Each loan would have supplied the trust with a steady
income for years, and likely decades, to come, secured by an interest in real
property. The Plan seeks to exchange for that value a one-time cash payment
of an amount likely not commensurate with the fair market value of the
collateral, much less with the total principal and interest that the home-
owner would have been expected to pay over the lifetime of the loan. Of
course, the local government seizing the mortgage loans would pay so little
126. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 242; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934) (“[The Constitution] precludes a construction which would
permit the state to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts
or the denial of means to enforce them.”).
127. See supra Part II.
128. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245; Epstein, supra note 109, at 717 (“The
contract clause is an explicit limitation upon the power of the state to trench upon individual
rights . . . .”); Bieneman, supra note 112, at 2552 (“[T]he Contracts Clause rests on the moral
maxim that parties should be entitled to rely on promises made to them.”).
129. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 241.
130. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977).
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as just compensation because the prospect of every underwater homeowner
continuing to make payments is slim. But not all underwater homeowners
will default, and as the economy improves, fewer of them will fall behind or
walk away. Replacing a loan that might be paid in full thirty years from now
with a discounted approximation of the current value of the collateral seems
like it would be a fairly serious impairment.
Supporters of the Plan might argue, however, that the degree of impair-
ment would be minor because financial markets exchange cash flows for
lump sums every day or because holders of mortgage loans willingly accept
lump-sum payments in the form of foreclosure sale proceeds. But while cash
flows are indeed exchanged for lump sums on a frequent basis, these trans-
actions are carried out by willing buyers and sellers, not imposed by govern-
mental fiat. It is up to market participants to decide whether a cash flow or a
lump sum is in their best interest, and forcing one choice or the other on an
investor could constitute a substantial impairment. As argued in Section
III.A, this interest in private ordering is exactly what the Contracts Clause is
designed to protect.
Similarly, it would be inaccurate to argue that the Plan would simply
accelerate the monetary equivalent of a foreclosure sale because servicing
agreements prescribe when a servicer is authorized to foreclose and when it
is not.131 The contracting parties thus get to choose under what conditions
they are willing to settle for foreclosure sale proceeds rather than the contin-
uing obligation of the loan.132
Furthermore, the Contracts Clause test measures the degree of impair-
ment by the aggregate effect of the state action, not by the scale of impair-
ment to each individual contract.133 The financial firms that create private
securitization trusts and sell the securities administer dozens of trusts that
hold hundreds or thousands of loans each, so the impairment caused by
writing down tens of thousands of loans would be significant. Therefore,
even if a court were to find that the impairment of each individual mortgage
loan would be minor, it would likely find the Plan’s overall impairment of
contracts to be serious. This impairment would also be permanent, a factor
that the court would consider in the test’s second prong. Assuming that the
131. See Thompson, supra note 49, at 794 (“Subprime servicers, in particular, are ex-
pected to show ‘strict adherence to explicit timelines,’ offer and accept workouts from only a
predefined and standardized set of options, and not delay foreclosure while loss mitigation is
underway.” (quoting Diane Pendly et al., Criteria Report: Rating U.S. Residential
Mortgage Servicers 11 (2006))).
132. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245 (“Contracts enable individuals to order
their personal and business affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once ar-
ranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to
rely on them.”).
133. See, e.g., id. at 244–47 (analyzing impairment created by law imposing duty to
provide pensions to employees according to the plaintiff employer’s total impairment, not the
impairment created in regard to each individual employment contract).
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court would classify the Plan’s impairment of contractual obligations as seri-
ous and permanent, courts would scrutinize it closely when applying the
two-part Contracts Clause test.134
C. Significant and Legitimate Public Purpose
The first prong of the test—that the law be aimed at a significant and
legitimate public purpose—closely resembles the first part of the rational
basis inquiry from the Takings Clause analysis described in Part II, with the
qualifications that the public purpose must be “significant” as well as “legiti-
mate” and that the seriousness of the Plan’s impairment would require
courts to scrutinize it more rigorously than rational basis analysis
demands.135
The Supreme Court first began to develop the requirement that contract
impairment serve a significant and legitimate public purpose in 1934, when
the Court found that a foreclosure moratorium was valid in part because it
was intended to address the general social and economic problem of the
foreclosure crisis that accompanied the Great Depression.136 In one of the
Court’s most recent Contracts Clause decisions, it found a legitimate public
purpose in protecting vulnerable consumers from quickly escalating gas
prices that would “cause hardship among those who use gas heat but must
exist on limited fixed incomes.”137 Conversely, the Court struck down a Min-
nesota pension law largely because there was no evidence in the record that a
lack of pension benefits was a widespread social or economic problem or
that, even if it were, the Minnesota legislature had had that public purpose
in mind when it passed the law.138
The Court’s most recent interpretations of the public purpose prong
have considered the breadth of the class affected by the statute in determin-
ing whether the statute targets a broad social or economic problem.139 For
instance, the Court invalidated a law that targeted the narrow class of em-
ployers who (1) had more than one hundred employees, (2) had established
a pension plan, and (3) had subsequently terminated the pension plan or left
the state.140 The Court did so partly on the ground that the law failed to
satisfy the first prong of the Contracts Clause test because it had “an ex-
tremely narrow focus.”141 In a subsequent case, the Court reiterated that to
134. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12
(1983); Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 250.
135. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 411–12; Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at
244–45.
136. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
137. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 416–17.
138. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247–48.
139. Id. at 250; see also Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 411–12.
140. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 248–50.
141. Id. at 248, 250.
158 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 112:139
serve a legitimate public purpose, a statute must not merely “provid[e] a
benefit to special interests.”142
The Plan would likely satisfy the public purpose prong of the Contracts
Clause test. Although critics argue that the Plan would confer a benefit on
private firms that would assist local governments in administering it, any
incidental benefits that would accrue to private parties, in addition to the
public, would be irrelevant. The purpose of the Plan is to remedy the broad
social and economic harms of the foreclosure crisis.143 Furthermore, the class
targeted by the Plan is actually quite large. Nationwide, 27.5 percent of bor-
rowers are underwater,144 and the proportion is far higher in places consid-
ering the Plan.145 Even if eligibility were limited to loans held by private
trusts, that would still include a sizeable number of homeowners—enough
to avoid accusations of impermissibly “narrow focus.”146 Indeed, the Court
has already sanctioned a foreclosure crisis as a sufficiently broad and general
social and economic problem to satisfy the test.147 The current foreclosure
crisis is the very definition of such a problem, and reducing the rate of fore-
closures in distressed areas would therefore constitute a significant and legit-
imate public purpose.148
D. Necessity and Proportionality
The more difficult question is that of the second prong, which requires
that the character and scope of the legislation be reasonably necessary and
proportionate to the public purpose.149 The Supreme Court has only relied
on the second prong in one case—Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co.—in the last fifty years, which leaves the manner of its
application somewhat uncertain.150 In that case, the Court found an altera-
tion of indefinite price escalation clauses in natural gas contracts to be of a
142. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 412.
143. It is also worth noting that in Allied Structural Steel, the State could not, even ex
post facto, concoct a believable case that the legislation had been aimed at solving a broad
economic or social problem, rather than at a particular employer that planned to abolish its
pension plan. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247–48, 250.
144. Nearly 2 Million American Homeowners Freed from Negative Equity in 2012, Zil-
low (Feb. 21, 2013), http://zillow.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=159&item=334.
145. See, e.g., Louis Aguilar, Almost Half of Metro Detroit Homeowners ‘Underwater’,
Detroit News (Feb. 13, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20130213/BIZ/
302130352.
146. See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 248, 250.
147. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444–45 (1934).
148. See id.
149. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
(1983).
150. Id. at 418–19. The Allied Structural Steel Court did not reach the second prong
because the law at issue could not survive the first prong, Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at
250, and the holding in U.S. Trust Co., the only other case to invalidate a law under the
Contracts Clause in modern times, depended on the heightened scrutiny applied when a state
impairs its own obligations, U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
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character and scope reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose, both be-
cause the alteration was temporary and because it merely filled a gap in
existing natural gas regulatory schemes.151
That the Plan would not resemble the law at issue in Energy Reserves
Group in those aspects may point to a constitutional flaw in the Plan. This is
because the impairment of contract rights under the Plan would be perma-
nent and because the Plan cannot be described as merely a new variation on
an existing regulatory scheme, given that this use of eminent domain is
novel. But two factors complicate the analysis. First, the use of eminent do-
main is a familiar type of state action, and the Plan is therefore merely a new
use of a longstanding governmental policy tool. Second, the Court in Energy
Reserves Group upheld a law against a Contracts Clause challenge; the case
therefore cannot necessarily be relied on to provide clear guidance about
what a state may not do. And it is worth emphasizing that the Supreme
Court has not struck down a state law under the second prong of the Con-
tracts Clause test since 1934.152
One other case warrants discussion here because the legislation at issue
was superficially similar to the Plan, but it ultimately has little to offer in
determining how a court today would analyze the Plan under the Contracts
Clause. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh concerned a number of Arkansas
statutes enacted to alleviate the foreclosure crisis accompanying the Great
Depression; these statutes offered a delinquent property owner benefits,
such as additional time to make payments, and created new procedural hur-
dles for creditors attempting to foreclose.153 The Court held that, although
the foreclosure crisis in the wake of the Great Depression was a serious pub-
lic problem, the Arkansas statutes meant to address it were oppressive and
immoderate and therefore violated the Contracts Clause.154 The legislature
had, “[w]ith studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee . . . taken
from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational
investor.”155
Although Kavanaugh suggests that the Plan would be found unconstitu-
tional, its import is limited. Kavanaugh preceded a long line of cases that
approved more expansive impairments of contract obligations.156 More im-
portantly, Kavanaugh deviated from prior cases’ public-purpose and reason-
able-means analyses by applying a more holistic kind of Contracts Clause
151. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 418–19.
152. See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1934).
153. 295 U.S. 56, 61 (1935).
154. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 60–62.
155. Id. at 60.
156. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. 400 (allowing Kansas to invalidate contract
provisions marking contract prices for natural gas to governmentally established prices for
natural gas); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (allowing Texas to retroactively
alter contracts for sale of public land to make it more difficult for defaulting buyers to reinstate
their claims); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (allowing
New Jersey to retroactively restrict withdrawals from building and loan associations and to
prohibit members from suing to recover the value of their shares).
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evaluation that judged the constitutionality of a law entirely by the severity
of its impairment of obligations.157 That severity-only analysis has been re-
jected by subsequent decades of Contracts Clause jurisprudence in favor of
the two-prong test discussed above.158 Although Kavanaugh is therefore
merely an abandoned branch of the Contracts Clause tree, it demonstrates
that the Court could be moved to deviate from its rigid test if it were to
conclude that a state had simply gone too far in disturbing the private order-
ing of contracting parties.
It seems, then, that the facts of the past century of Supreme Court Con-
tracts Clause cases have little to offer when it comes to assessing how the
Plan would fare under the second prong of the test. There are simply too few
cases from modern times to successfully draw a straight line between the
impairment in contractual obligations that the Plan would cause and past
impairments that have come before the Court. What is left is simply to apply
the test according to its plain terms, taking existing case law into account.
Are the character and scope of the Plan reasonably necessary and pro-
portionate to the nature and scope of the public purpose? That is, to allevi-
ate the economic suffering and uncertainty of a municipality’s residents, to
address the blight caused by vacancies and dwindling property values, and to
improve the health of the local economy and of the tax base by reducing the
number of foreclosures, is it reasonably necessary and proportionate to alter
or abrogate thousands of contracts seriously and permanently? It is unlikely
that the Court would find the Plan to be a reasonably necessary and propor-
tionate response. The few laws struck down under the Clause in the past
century did not create such widespread and irreversible impairment.159 The
past one hundred years of Contracts Clause cases have upheld mortgage
moratoria,160 price controls,161 retroactive modification of contracts for the
sale of land,162 and restrictions on the ability of certificate holders to with-
draw those certificates.163 But those impairments of contract rights are mi-
nor compared to “the repudiation of debts” that the Plan would create.164
Indeed, the clear precedent permitting foreclosure-moratorium legisla-
tion undermines the constitutionality of the Plan.165 A court could easily
find that if preventing foreclosures is the aim, there exists a clear alternative
157. See Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. passim.
158. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 411–12; Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus, 438 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1978).
159. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 249–50 (striking down a law impairing
one employer’s employment contracts); U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
20–21 (1977) (striking down a repeal of covenant limiting Port Authority deficits that “per-
mits a diminution of the pledged revenues and reserves,” impairing the states’ contract with
Port Authority bondholders); Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 61.
160. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234–35 (1945).
161. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 415–16.
162. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965).
163. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
164. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
165. Hahn, 326 U.S. at 234–35; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439.
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that would (1) bear the Supreme Court’s Contracts Clause imprimatur and
(2) create only a temporary impairment rather than the permanent abroga-
tion the Plan would create. A moratorium on foreclosures could stave off
vacancies and the attendant blight while buying time for the market to im-
prove and thus for housing prices to rise. This would be the sort of tempo-
rary impairment that the Court seems to favor. Because laws creating
temporary impairments are necessarily limited in scope—limited to a cer-
tain period of time—they are more likely to be of a scope proportionate to
the legitimate and significant public purpose at hand, satisfying the second
prong of the test.166 That the Court’s limited Contracts Clause jurisprudence
evinces a preference for foreclosure moratoria is likely probative in hypothe-
sizing how a court would treat the Plan.167
More abstractly, the Plan’s likely severe and permanent impairment of
mortgage holders’ contractual expectations prompts the following question:
If the Contracts Clause does not prohibit this, what does it prohibit? The
current Supreme Court is deeply concerned with precisely this type of ques-
tion.168 And if the Plan were to come before the Court, opponents of the
Plan would be right to argue that if the Contracts Clause means anything at
all, it means that a state and its instrumentalities cannot permanently impair
the obligation of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of contracts,
even in pursuit of a legitimate and praiseworthy public purpose.169
Conclusion
Local governments have started putting their power of eminent domain
to novel use to rescue their communities from the foreclosure crisis. Al-
though the Plan would be constitutional under the Takings Clause, it would
be unlikely to survive a Contracts Clause challenge. Reducing the rate of
foreclosures is a legitimate public purpose, and principal reduction is a ra-
tional—even proven—way of achieving that goal. Thus, the Plan satisfies the
deferential rational basis review prompted by a Takings Clause challenge but
fails under the more demanding Contracts Clause test. The Plan seeks to use
eminent domain to pursue a scheme that local governments could not con-
stitutionally carry out by other means and entails a permanent and serious
impairment of loan contracts. Although the Plan would be aimed at a broad
166. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 418–19; Hahn, 326 U.S. at 233–35; Blaisdell,
290 U.S. at 447.
167. See Hahn, 326 U.S. 230; Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
168. Cf., e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida, decided sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No.
11-398) (question of Justice Kennedy) (“Well, then the question is whether or not there are
any limits on the Commerce Clause. Can you identify for us some limits on the Commerce
Clause?”); id. at 28 (question of Justice Scalia) (“What—what is left? If the government can do
this, what—what else can it not do?”).
169. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978) (“If the Con-
tract Clause is to retain any meaning at all . . . it must be understood to impose some limits
upon the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of
its otherwise legitimate police power.”).
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social and economic problem, its scheme of principal reduction by fiat is not
a necessary and proportionate response to that problem and would likely be
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause.
